
SECURITY PATTERNS

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Intent and Motivation

- Information and identity are valued much more than before.
- Lack of foresight in security implementation leaves the gates wide open for exploitation.
- Improvement in tech has made 'Hacking' easier than ever before with novel means being discovered each day.
- A security pattern is a solution that addresses a class of security problems/flaws.
- Security Patterns offer comprehensive solutions by treating Security as a Functional requirement in software design.
- Security patterns help achieve CIA (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability) of information.

Classification of Security Patterns



Some Examples of Security Flaws and exploitation

```
The program has been running 70452 times so far.
                                                                                                                    void myprintf(char *msg)
  ./exploit-T4.sh: line 13: 10182 Segmentation fault
                                                   ./stack
                                                                                       Privilege Escalation!
  2 minutes and 4 seconds elapsed.
  The program has been running 70453 times so far.
                                                                                                                        printf(msg);
                                                                                                                        printf("%s",msg);
  uid=0(root) gid=1000(seed) groups=1000(seed),4(adm),24(cdrom),27(sudo),30(dip),46(pluqdev),113(lpadmin),128(sambashare)
                                                             char string1[20];
TOCTTOU Example Redux
                                                                                               Buffer Overflow?
                                                             strncpy(string1,
Attack ordered before or after check and use
                                                                          "This is a really long string", 20);

    System transactions save the day

                                   Attacker
         Victim
                                                                      Process Address Space
                                                                                                          Sign in
                            symlink("secret","foo");
                                                                                                                               ???
                                                             OXFFFF
                                                                       Top of Stack
   sys_xbegin();
                                                                                                          Email
                                                                       Stack Overflow?
   if(access("foo")) {
                              Race Condition!
                                                                                                           test@example.com' OR 1 = 1 --
     fd = open("foo");
                                                                       Return Address
                                                              Stack
                                                                                             String
                                                                                                          Password
     sys_xend();
                                                                       Canary Word
                                                             Growth
                                                                                             Growth
                                                                       Local Variables ...
                                                                                                           *******
                            symlink("secret","foo");
                    time ↓
                                                                       buffer


✓ Stay signed in

                                                                                                           Sign in
```

0x0000

Demo of Buffer Overflow:


Race Condition example



Restrictive Memory Access Pattern

The possible exploitation: -

- Heap Buffer Overflow
- Shellshock-BashCGI
- Side Channel Attacks
- Dirty Copy-on-Write



(Taken as per Linux context)

Implementation of Restrictive Memory Pattern

- 1. Eliminate Racing or make winning odds unfavorable for attacker
- 2. Use secure libraries/frameworks
- 3. Least Privilege Principle and service privilege levels
- 4. Sandboxing/clear memory boundaries
- 5. Update systems and applications

Formatted Strings

```
#include<stdio.h>

int main()


int id = 100, age =25;

char* name = "Smith";

printf("ID:%d Name:%s Age:%d\n",id, name, age);

return 0;
}
```

```
#include<stdio.h>
       int main()
         int id = 100, age =25;
         char* name = "Smith";
         printf("ID:%d \nName:%s \nAge:%d\n",id, name);
         return 0;
                                                            Desk
Koushiks-MBP:Desktop koushik$ gcc ex.c
          warning:
  printf("ID:%d \nName:%s \nAge:%d\n",id, name);
1 warning generated.
Koushiks-MBP:Desktop koushik$ ./a.out
ID:100
Name: Smith
Age:-283980752
Koushiks-MBP:Desktop koushik$
```



Counter Measures

- 1. Developers must have a good practice to not use user inputs as an part of a format string.
- 2. Compilers these days have built-in counter measures for detecting potential format string vulnerabilities.
- 3. Address Randomization

SQL injection


One of the most common attacks on web applications.

• Sql is a code injection technique.

Exploits vulnerabilities between web applications and database servers.

Occurs when user inputs are not properly checked.

Activity Diagram



SQL Injection Demo

- 1. User:Admin Pass:seedadmin
- 2. User:Alice Pass:seedalice
- 3. User:Admin'#

SQL Injection preventive measures

- Do Some validation checks at client.
- Usage of Prepared statements.

Client Input Filter Pattern (Sanitize i/p)

Ignore the client validation. Do the validation at the server once again.

- Data validity checks
- Sensitive information from the client should be kept in a encrypted, tamper-proof form.
- Discard request that are obviously questionable.
- Filter the data submitted from the client.
- Remove script tags.

Trade offs

Accountability	No effect.
Availability	If overly sensitive, this pattern can have an adverse effect on availability, preventing legitimate users from using the site.
Confidentiality	No effect.
Integrity	This pattern greatly enhances the integrity of the data processed by a Web site.
Manageability	The management burden could be increased if overly sensitive sanity checks result in a high number of false reports of attacks that must be investigated.
Usability	No effect.
Performance	This pattern will incur a small performance penalty, since it requires some time to perform checks. If data is stored in encrypted form on the client, encrypting and decrypting the data will also exact a performance hit.
Cost	This pattern has fixed implementation costs. However, if overly sensitive it could greatly increase the customer service burden on the site.

More examples: Lack of Input Sanitization

- System() call
- Shell-Shock Command Injection
- XSS (Cross Site Scripting)
- Kernel Memory Access using Loadable Kernel Module

System()

- A C function in stdlib.h
- Execute a shell command.
- Treats the argument as shell command.

```
#include <string.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
       char *v[3];
       char *command;
       if(argc < 2)
               printf("Please type a file name.\n");
               return 1;
       v[0] = "/bin/cat"; v[1] = argv[1]; v[2] = NULL;
       command = malloc(strlen(v[0]) + strlen(v[1]) + 2);
       sprintf(command, "%s %s", v[0], v[1]);
       // Use only one of the followings.
       system(command);
       // execve(v[0], v, NULL);
       return 0 ;
```

```
[09/12/18]seed@VM:~/.../Lab1-SetUID$ ./Task8 "filetoread; mv filetoread fileread" reading...
[09/12/18]seed@VM:~/.../Lab1-SetUID$ ls *file*

fileread
[09/12/18]seed@VM:~/.../Lab1-SetUID$ |
```

Shell-Shock – Command Injection

```
[11/04/18]seed@VM:.../Elgg$ /bin/bash_shellshock
[11/04/18]seed@VM:.../Elgg$ foo='() { echo "hello"; }'
[11/04/18]seed@VM:.../Elgg$ echo $foo
() { echo "hello"; }
[11/04/18]seed@VM:.../Elgg$ export foo
[11/04/18]seed@VM:.../Elgg$ /bin/bash_shellshock
[11/04/18]seed@VM:.../Elgg$ foo
hello
```

```
/bin/bash 71x24
[09/30/18]seed@VM:~$ foo='() { echo "hello world"; }; echo "extra";'
[09/30/18]seed@VM:~$ export foo
[09/30/18]seed@VM:~$ /bin/bash_shellshock
extra
```

Shell-Shock - Command Injection

```
***** Environment Variable *****
HTTP HOST=localhost
HTTP USER AGENT=curl/7.47.0
HTTP ACCEPT=*/*
PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin
SERVER SIGNATURE=<address>Apache/2.4.18 (Ubuntu) Server at localhost Po
rt 80</address>
SERVER SOFTWARE=Apache/2.4.18 (Ubuntu)
SERVER NAME=localhost
SERVER ADDR=127.0.0.1
SERVER PORT=80
REMOTE ADDR=127.0.0.1
DOCUMENT ROOT=/var/www/html
REQUEST SCHEME=http
CONTEXT PREFIX=/cgi-bin/
CONTEXT DOCUMENT ROOT=/usr/lib/cgi-bin/
```

curl -A, --user-agent <agent string>


Shell-Shock - Command Injection

```
[09/30/18]seed@VM:.../cgi-bin$ curl -A 'hello' http://localhost/cgi-bir
/showEnviron.cgi
***** Environment Variable *****
HTTP HOST=localhost
HTTP USER AGENT=hello
HTTP ACCEPT=*/*
PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin
SERVER SIGNATURE=<address>Apache/2.4.18 (Ubuntu) Server at localhost Po
rt 80</address>
SERVER SOFTWARE=Apache/2.4.18 (Ubuntu)
SERVER NAME=localhost
SERVER ADDR=127.0.0.1
SERVER PORT=80
REMOTE ADDR=127.0.0.1
DOCUMENT ROOT=/var/www/html
REQUEST SCHEME=http
CONTEXT PREFIX=/cgi-bin/
CONTEXT DOCUMENT ROOT=/usr/lib/cgi-bin/
SERVER ADMIN=webmaster@localhost
SCRIPT FILENAME=/usr/lib/cgi-bin/showEnviron.cgi
REMOTE PORT=38710
GATEWAY INTERFACE=CGI/1.1
SERVER PROTOCOL=HTTP/1.1
REQUEST METHOD=GET
QUERY STRING=
REQUEST URI=/cgi-bin/showEnviron.cgi
SCRIPT NAME=/cgi-bin/showEnviron.cgi
```

[11/04/18]seed@VM:~\$ curl -A '() { echo "hello"; }; rm -rf ./' http://19.97.31.1 28/web


XSS (Cross Site Scripting)

It is a security vulnerability attack for web applications, which is a kind of code injection. It allows malicious users to inject code into a web page, and other users are affected when they view the web page. This type of attack usually includes HTML and a client-side scripting language.




Kernel Memory Access

- Often when users are required to interact directly with kernel using features like Loadable Kernel Modules (LKM), we neglect that invalid usage might lead to the application crashing.
- While this is an built functionality in linux to prevent modification and access to protected memory, it is essential to note that these accesses to memory must be pre-defined and 'white-listed' while other exceptions must be handled so that they may not affect program functionality.




Similarity Among Code-Injection Attacks



Input Sanitization Pattern

- Input validation should be done at trusted server/client side
 - Identify the source
 - Parts in software which reads the input
 - Define criteria for validation
 - Handling invalid cases
 - Code for validation and handling invalid cases.



Advantages of Implementing Security Patterns:

- Secure coding techniques ensure greater system security.
- Security is viewed as functional requirement in Software Engg.
- The confidentiality & privacy of client will be improved.
- A small number of patterns would improve performance, like Client Data Storage pattern, etc.
- While cost of implementation is incurred, it is a better than the cost incurred when there a security flaw is exploited.

Disadvantages of implementing Security Patterns:

- Most of patterns would incur a performance penalty.
- Cost in terms of manpower, training, testing and infrastructure increases.
- Specific security solutions get outdated quickly and there is a constant need to be updated.

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- 4. Code Demonstrations: http://www.cis.syr.edu/~wedu/seed/labs.html
- 5. Security Patterns Repository v1.0 Darrell M. Kienzle et. al
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