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© 2001
Syracuse Online.
All rights reserved.

By Jorge Luis Romeu

Vicente Fox, the PAN opposition candidate, won the recent Mexican presidential elections, ending the 71-year-old power hegemony of the PRI, the officialę/QL/0600,0011party. Will this victory bring democracy to Mexico? A long look at the PRI and what it stands for helps explain the meaning and scope of the election results and forthcoming alternatives in this exciting Mexican period.

The PRI, Partido Revolucionario Institucional, was founded byMexico's strong man, Gen. Plutarco E. Calles, in 1929. These were difficult times, just after the Guerra Cristera, the bloody, three-year religious civil war that tore Mexico apart. Jose Vasconcelos, a well-known educator, was the opposition candidate and had support from the Cristeros, who hated President Calles' anti-Catholic policies. But using all the government machinery and power, Calles' party prevailed - as it has ever since, until now.

One could also trace the PRI's origins back to 1920, when Gens. Alvaro Obregon and Calles struck a deal by which they would alternate in the presidency, supporting the other when out of office. Obregon was elected first, in 1920, then Calles in 1924. When Obregon was again elected in 1928, he was murdered - some say under Calles' orders. To continue with his scheme and his nationalistic policies, Calles came up with this PRI idea.

To understand the need for such a scheme, its depth and success, one must go back still a few more years. The Mexican Revolution of 1910 began under the slogan "no re-election," alluding to President Porfirio Diaz' 40 years of uncontested power, obtained via periodic re-election. Even though Diaz managed to halt Mexico's disintegration and economic decline, he became very unpopular. For the price of stability and prosperity was the rise of a small class of wealthy landowners, at the expense of countless Indian peasants. In addition, the periodic re-elections of Diaz prevented the establishment of a stable succession mechanism.

The concerns of the 1910 revolution - and perhaps also of the founders of the PRI - were to address these two important national problems. The revolution had opened a 20-year-long period of violence and devastation, while the PRI managed to bring back a measure of peace, prosperity and stability. It all worked out in the following manner: In the political realm, the president could never be re-elected; in exchange, he would be almost like a king, with the right to appoint his successor under a strict, non-written set of rules; this addressed the re-election and succession problems of the Diaz era and gave the PRI regime its stability.

"El Dedazo," or anointment of the presidential successor, was a well-structured process. It precluded the elevation of a brother, son or other relative or intimate crony, as was usually done by such dictators as Somoza, Trujillo or Castro. It would have to be someone else, often from a different wing of the broad PRI coalition. This provided political balance and a sort of corrective mechanism.

For example, leftist Cardenas was followed by conservative Avila Camacho, and statists Echeverria and Lopez Portillo were followed by free-marketeers De La Madrid and Salinas. Even apparently minor details, such as lobbying for the presidential position, were regulated via such popular sayings as "el que se mueve no sale en la foto" ("he who pleads is disqualified").

The PRI's succession policy allowed new teams to substitute each other every six years, thus avoiding the formation of small power elites or the rise of dogmatic absolutism. With this pragmatic approach, the PRI managed to hold on to power for over 70 years. In the economic realm, the PRI espoused land reform in a country overwhelmingly rural, even when it did not always make good economic sense. This allowed landless peasants to acquire some economic independence and a sense of pride, and provided the political base that gave the PRI its broad popular support.

Moreover, in 1938, President Cardenas nationalized the oil industry, providing the economic power to launch many social programs and obtaining the support of organized labor and of the nationalistic masses. Cardenas remains one of the most popular Mexican presidents.

With these social and economic policies, plus patronage, strong-arm tactics when needed and corruption, the PRI maintained power with the support of much, if not the majority, of the Mexican people.

On the other hand, the PRI was never an ideological party but "el partido del gobierno," the group that ran the country. People could join it whatever their ideology, religion, philosophy or lack thereof. The glue that held it together was money and power, patronage and corruption, and a sense of national purpose. As a result, the epoch of revolts, military uprisings and civil wars that had damaged Mexico so badly during the 19th century became a thing of the past. This was no small success.

Under the PRI, no foreign invasions or territorial losses occurred. Literacy rose from 30 to 90 percent, and dozens of public and private universities were created, fostering social and economic mobility and the emergence of a large and strong middle class. It was this middle class and its socioeconomic development that ultimately nurtured the discontent and opposition that brought down the PRI.

The PRI's redeeming quality has been precisely that it has recognized this situation and has allowed the country to evolve via a peaceful electoral process. Such a transition has not been easy - it is the result of many years of hard labor, sweat and even the blood of many Mexicans, including some from the PRI itself. And it has taken place during the last 20 years. This is no small potatoes, but something many other regimes, such as Castro's Cuba, could learn from.

During this time many local, state and federal offices have been won, one by one, by the two largest opposition parties: the conservative, Catholic, pro-business Partido de Accion Nacional (PAN), founded by Manuel Gomez Morin in 1939; and the leftist, statist, Partido Revolucionario Democratico (PRD), founded as a splinter of PRI by Heberto Castillo in the 1980s. Both have been gaining ground at the expense of the PRI, to the point that in July, the PAN won by a plurality in a three-way race and the PRD won Mexico City.

So what will the new political landscape look like if the PAN and PRD move back to their traditional right/left positions? Who will occupy the political center, where the PRI has most recently positioned itself?

Such a void could be filled by a "new PRI," ready to compete in a multiparty system, integrated by its younger faction that has worked hard to open up the system and make it more democratic. This "new PRI" faction has fought a tough internal power struggle against the "dinosaurs." If, instead, the PRI fails to evolve, it may implode, giving birth to or feeding other new, centrist groups.

Will Mexico maintain its hard-won social and economic gains and its internal peace and stability in this new and exciting stage? As a Cuban, I sincerely wish my Mexican brothers the best of luck!

Jorge Luis Romeu, of Syracuse, is a former Senior Fulbright Scholar to Mexico and an emeritus SUNY professor. He directs the Juarez-Lincoln-Marti Project and frequently travels to and teaches in Mexico.

Thursday, September 7, 2000