

ON POLITICAL INTOLERANCE AND CUBA'S FUTURE: A SPANISH CARIBBEAN APPROACH¹

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ABSTRACT

The present paper presents a critical analysis of the last 250 years of Cuban political history, from a perspective of its integration in the Spanish Caribbean. We discuss how the traditional Cuban political and ideological intolerance has contributed to the creation of an inefficient model of regime succession that has taken the country to its current stage. We present and examine several national and international conditions that we believe are necessary to achieve a peaceful transition toward an open and pluralistic system. We analyze and compare the transitions in Brazil, Mexico and Spain. And we draw several conclusions that may be applicable to the Cuban case.

Keywords: Cuba, Latin America, history, politics, dictatorship, transition

RESUMEN

El presente trabajo presenta un análisis crítico de la historia política cubana de los últimos 250 años, desde la perspectiva de su integración dentro del Caribe Hispánico. Discutimos cómo la tradicional intolerancia política e ideológica cubana ha ayudado a construir un ineficiente modelo de sucesión de regímenes, que ha llevado al país a la situación actual. Se presentan y examinan algunas condiciones, nacionales e internacionales, que creemos necesarias para realizar una transición pacífica hacia un régimen abierto y pluralista. Y se analizan y comparan las transiciones de Brasil, México y España, de las que derivamos algunas conclusiones aplicables al caso cubano.

Palabras clave: Cuba, América Latina, historia, política, dictadura, transición

RÉSUMÉ

Cet article présente une analyse critique de l'histoire politique de Cuba au cours des 250 dernières années, dans la perspective de son intégration dans la Caraïbe hispanique. La discussion montre comment la traditionnelle intolérance politique et idéologique cubaine a contribué à la création d'un modèle de succession de régime inefficace, qui a mené le pays à la situation actuelle. Certaines conditions, aux niveaux

national et international, jugées nécessaires pour une transition pacifique vers un régime ouvert et pluraliste, sont présentées et examinées. Les processus de transition au Brésil, au Mexique et en Espagne sont analysés et comparés pour en déduire plusieurs conditions applicables au cas de Cuba.

Mots-clés : Cuba, Amérique Latine, politique, dictature, transition

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Pobre Cuba, tan lejos de Dios y tan cerca de los EEUU.

Adaptation of a phrase by General Porfirio Díaz.

Introduction

The Question *Where is Cuba Going?* has been frequently asked, since Raúl Castro took over Cuba's government from his brother Fidel, in 2006, and started implementing reforms. Even at diaspora forums, such as the 2012 ASCE² Conference, the issue was raised. However, such question may elicit several contradictory answers. For, the current environment of *political intolerance*,³ that has traditionally plagued Cuban history, prevents parties in discordance from conducting fruitful negotiations, and arriving to efficient solutions. And we don't see any improvements until such situation changes.

The relationship between intolerance and lack of negotiations, with system failure is evident, as are also the advantages of tolerance and sound negotiating, with institutional progress. Such occurs under any political system; compare, for example, the impasse occurred in the American Congress, in 1994 and 2013,⁴ with the fruitful legislation of the Johnson administration,⁵ in the 1960s. Such problems are particularly destructive in totalitarian systems, where one of the two sectors monopolizes the power.

This paper overviews the last 250 years of Cuban history, with the objective of analyzing and identifying certain recurrent events, and extracting from them the key elements that characterize Cuba's proverbial intolerance. We illustrate the problems of intolerance under (1) the Spanish colony (1760-1899); (2) the Republic (1900 to 1959); and (3) the revolution (1959, to present). We identify common causes and features of intolerance, during these different periods. And we define a Cuban political behavioral model.

We then provide three examples of Ibero-American countries,

where a negotiations process helped resolve serious national crises, and fostered peaceful evolutions from dictatorship to pluralism. The examples correspond to three very different countries, in three different time-frames and under three different political situations. They are, Spain in 1975; Brazil in 1985, and Mexico, in 2000. However different, they all overcome the previous intolerance, opening up their respective societies, thus achieving economic, political and social growth, way above their respective previous levels.

Finally, we propose to use such examples as a framework for the transitioning out of Cuba's half-a-century old dictatorship. Both Cuba's government and opposition can take ideas from these examples, adapting them to the Cuban situation and conditions.

Overview of the Spanish Colony in the XVIII and XIX Century

We begin in the 1760s. Before that, Cuba, Santo Domingo, Puerto Rico and Venezuela (which until the XVIII Century, was under the *Capitanía General* of Santo Domingo), were poor and ill-attended colonies, because they did not have precious metals.⁶ Hence, Spain invested small in them, and left them mostly to their own resources.

The city of Havana was an exception. For its excellent harbor and strategic position, it became the meeting place for the Spanish Fleet.⁷ Havana became much richer and important than any other city in the Spanish Caribbean⁸ —or in Cuba. For, *the interior*,⁹ especially the traditionally neglected Eastern provinces of the island, had prospered mainly on illicit trade.¹⁰ These large socioeconomic differences define the love-hate relationship and rivalry between Havana and *el interior*, which continue to our days.

In 1759, King Charles III, who had already ruled Naples for over twenty years, inherited the Spanish crown. With his long experience in government and very capable ministers,¹¹ Charles III inaugurated a period of badly needed reforms, in Spain and its colonies.

In 1762, during the French and Indian War,¹² the British attacked Havana, and held it for two years. This event changed the fate of the colony. The strategic position of Havana was so valuable to Spain that, after the war, it traded it to the British for Florida.¹³ For the remaining years of the XVIII Century, Spain sent to Cuba a series of capable governors¹⁴ who improved its social and material conditions, especially in and around Havana.

In 1789, the French Revolution changed Europe, as well as its colonies.¹⁵ New ideas of liberty and equality encouraged the Haitian slave revolt and subsequent independence.¹⁶ The consequences of Haiti's revolution for all Spanish Caribbean,¹⁷ especially for Cuba, were

significant. The impact on its economy and its population were extensive: hundreds of French planters moved to Cuba, re-establishing their efficient sugar and coffee plantations, and contributing a wealth of new ideas¹⁸ and customs.

From the 1790s onward, Cuba took the place of the English and French sugar islands,¹⁹ leading the world's sugar production. The new economic policy of Francisco de Arango y Parreno, a Cuban criollo, to make of Cuba the heir of Saint Domingue, was one decisive event in its history. For, it promoted the importation of large numbers of black slaves to develop the emergent sugar industry, transforming Cuba from a sleepy colony to a rich plantation. The ensuing changes created the economic growth that followed in the next 80 years, as well as the demographics and the complex socioeconomic background for the political movements that developed throughout the XIX Century.

A second decisive event affecting Cuba was the independence of the United States, and its territorial expansion. Americans worked to enlarge their country to its natural borders: Pacific Ocean, British Canada, and Mexico.²⁰ But Americans also had a place, in their expansion plans, for Cuba,²¹ an island at the entrance of the strategic Gulf of Mexico. Coping with (1) the growth of the sugar industry and its economic and demographic consequences, and (2) the American efforts to acquire Cuba,²² has driven the island's history since the start of the XIX Century to date. These events have also defined four lines of thought that, under different forms and names, prevail in Cuban politics: (1) colonialism;²³ (2) annexation;²⁴ (3) autonomy;²⁵ and (4) independence.²⁶

Slave trade and development of the sugar industry widened the existing breach between the eastern and western parts of Cuba, replicating at a smaller scale, the differences between the Spanish and French parts of Saint Domingue. Large plantations with hundreds of recently-brought African slaves and few free blacks and mulattos, prevailed in the western part of the island. Smaller plantations with fewer slaves, many if not most born in Cuba and speaking Spanish, and a large class of small and medium white, free blacks, and mulatto²⁷ farmers, merchants and artisans, existed in the eastern part. This difference in peoples and socioeconomic conditions, explains the different regional and historical developments that occurred during Cuba's two wars of independence.²⁸

A third important factor was political: Spain underwent its own liberal revolution only in the second half of the XIX Century,²⁹ after losing its larger and richer American colonies, becoming a third class European power. But Spain's incipient liberalism hardly extended to Cuba or Puerto Rico, its two remaining American colonies,³⁰ who suffered under military control.³¹ Instead, they became *cash cows*, where Spain sold its expensive products and profited from Cuba's sugar production.

In addition, the choicest colonial political positions were often used to reward generals and politicians, victorious in the frequent XIX Century Spanish revolutions, not always competent, to the detriment and chagrin of many well-qualified and willing island natives.

In spite of all above-mentioned problems, and of their strict colonial regime, Cuba and Puerto Rico grew economically, attracting many Spaniard (farmers, artisans and small merchants) immigrants, who helped create an incipient middle class, in and around, the main cities and towns. Cuba, in particular, went from the poor, semi-abandoned colony that it was up to the XVIII Century, to the most precious jewel of the Spanish crown.³²

Ignoring these key facts will undermine any effort to understand Cuban history during the XIX and XX Century. For, the Cuban economic and demographic situation in the XIX Century was the direct result of colonial policies to convert this island into the *Sugar Bowl* of the World. And most of Cuba's XX Century problems are just an extension and a complication of the problems created before its independence.

The Birth of the Cuban Nation: the XIX Century

There is a thread of ideas carrying through several generations of *criollos*, regarding Cuba's social and economic development. It starts with Francisco de Arango y Parreño, in the last decade of the XVIII Century, who fostered accelerated development of the sugar industry through massive importation of African slaves.³³ Alejandro Ramírez then expanded Arango's economic policies.³⁴ Fr. José Agustín Caballero, in the first decade of the XIX Century, wrote the first proposal for autonomy in the island. His student Félix Varela taught philosophy in the *Seminario de San Carlos*, and represented Cuba in the Spanish *Cortes* of 1820, where he also proposed autonomy for the island.³⁵

José Antonio Saco substituted Varela in the *Seminario*, wrote papers on Cuban economy and social development,³⁶ represented Cuba in the Spanish *cortes*, where he proposed the autonomy,³⁷ and was an ardent adversary of Cuba's annexation to the United States, a predominant theory of the times, among *criollos*. Another Varela student, José de la Luz y Caballero,³⁸ continued this work after Saco and Varela were forced into exile. Luz founded schools, chaired the *Sociedad Económica de Amigos del País*,³⁹ and died in the island in 1862, highly respected. The most prominent Cuban intellectuals of the XIX Century, including Del Monte and Mendive, and later Varona, Govin, Martí and others of the generation of 1880, were directly or indirectly, disciples of these first great Cubans.⁴⁰

During the period of 1835 to 1855, Cuba's landed and educated

classes became interested in the annexation to the United States. They thought Cuba was too small to conduct a successful independence movement. And they were afraid of the newly arrived black slaves. Those few who, at the time, looked into severing Cuba's ties from Spain, thought this only possible by joining a larger country, where slavery were legal. They would then acquire larger freedoms (of commerce), enjoy political rights—and also their slaves.⁴¹

Mutual intolerance created a gridlock: the Spanish authorities became reluctant to grant autonomy to the island, and *criollos* decided to seek separation from Spain at any cost, including annexation. There was no desire, or either side, to find a negotiated solution. For, the extremists of both groups were in control. And those few seeking a reasonable settlement had no leverage. In addition, large sectors of artisans, merchants and small farmers, white, free blacks or mulattos, remained indifferent to these initial efforts.⁴²

José A. Saco⁴³ firmly opposed the annexation to the United States. He wrote a series of articles⁴⁴ opposing such approach, arguing that if Cuba were to become an American state, its culture, language, customs, and eventually all the power of its landed classes would be rapidly overrun by the better organized and soon-more-numerous American immigrants.⁴⁵ Saco has been criticized for being a representative of his class and epoch. However, despite all his shortcomings, Saco remains Cuba's first genuine statesman.

Luz y Caballero, essentially an educator and moralist, is another case study of the evils of intolerance. The Spanish government considered Luz a dangerous separatist, unable to see that, as Varela and Saco before him, Luz sought a political evolution within Spain, in lieu of a costly and violent revolution for independence, or the annexation to another country. But colonial autonomy was still a concept way ahead of its time.

Cuban and Puertorrican hopes⁴⁶ were raised when, in 1866, Spain finally convened a *Junta de Información* to improve conditions in these islands. But only more and higher taxes resulted from this conference. And the frustration it brought about triggered Cuba's first War of Independence (1868-1878) as well as the *Grito de Lares*, in Puerto Rico.

Spain, as opposed to the British in Canada, was unable to address the plight of Cubans and Puerto Ricans,⁴⁷ because of shortcomings in its own political system.⁴⁸ Spanish liberals were unable to recognize the legitimate claims of its colonies.⁴⁹ Autonomy would only be granted to Cuba and Puerto Rico, in 1898, as a result of Cuba's Independence war, the Sagasta-Muñoz Rivera pact, and the threat of an imminent US intervention!

The Cuban War of 1868-78 destroyed the Eastern landed *criollo* class,⁵⁰ hurt the educated class, and the class of small and middle

size farmers and artisans,⁵¹ many of them free blacks and mulattos.⁵² However, this terrible war was not fought in vain. It brought (1) the emancipation of slaves,⁵³ (2) a limited but active two-party system,⁵⁴ and (3) laws of freedom of the press and of association.⁵⁵ In addition, the war affirmed Cuba's incipient nationality creating, during years that José Martí called *el reposo turbulento*,⁵⁶ a more homogeneous society; one that autonomists⁵⁷ and separatists could address, to build the ideological framework of the War of 1895, and to develop the basic organization of the new republic that emerged, after the First American Intervention of 1898-1902.

Had Cubans and Spaniards been more tolerant, that is, able to (1) intelligently discuss their differences, and (2) negotiate in due time an insular parliament, Saco's keystone proposal,⁵⁸ the terrible wars of 1868-78 and of 1895-98⁵⁹ could have been avoided. Spain would have not been humiliatingly defeated by the US, in what is known as *el Desastre del '98*,⁶⁰ losing her remaining empire, and becoming a third class power. But more significantly yet, Cuban and Puerto Rican history would have been very different.

Cuba and Puerto Rico could have formed an autonomous federation⁶¹ within Spain, a European nation that could provide stability and prevent foreign intervention, as in the island of Jamaica.⁶² Severed from Spain, Cuba and Puerto Rico, two small islands just a few miles off the largest economic, political and military power in the Americas, have experienced, directly or indirectly, serious economic and political pressure from the U.S.

This author finds completely incomprehensible the notorious segment of José Martí's unfinished letter to Mexican Manuel Mercado, found on Martí's desk at the time of his death at Dos Ríos.⁶³ For, with the separation of Cuba and Puerto Rico from Spain, the last obstacle that prevented US interventionism in the Spanish Caribbean was removed, as can be confirmed by the many American occupations that have occurred, after 1898.

The XX Century and the Republic

Cuba began its life as an independent nation with a remarkable act of political maturity and savvy:⁶⁴ accepting the Platt Amendment⁶⁵ imposed by the United States as a condition to terminate its military occupation. Unfortunately, since then, most Cuban politicians have demonstrated two negative traits: (1) lack of tolerance, refusing to negotiate with the opposition,⁶⁶ and (2) actively seeking US involvement whenever things have not come out their way.⁶⁷ Furthermore, (3) Cuban middle and educated classes, as a social category, have lacked an adequate involvement

in politics,⁶⁸ and (4) American governments have actively sought to influence, or intervene in, Cuban internal affairs.⁶⁹

Tomás Estrada Palma, Cuba's first President, created hundreds of schools, hired scores of teachers, and constitutes a classical example of intolerance and pro-Americanism. Don Tomás and his *Moderado* Party refused to accept the Liberal victory in the 1906 election. The latter instead of negotiating took to arms. Don Tomás, unable to quench the revolt, called in the Americans,⁷⁰ who established the Second Intervention (1906-09).

In the 1909 elections, the Liberals again won.⁷¹ Socioeconomic inequalities triggered a racial war in 1912,⁷² strongly repressed,⁷³ thus avoiding another intervention. In 1913, Conservative Mario García Menocal⁷⁴ was elected. During 1917 elections, Liberals again revolted⁷⁵ claiming that, as Don Tomás, Conservatives had misused government power to rig the results. Again, U.S. Marines were ready to come ashore, and some briefly landed in Oriente province. However, Liberals and Conservatives, realizing the imminent danger, toned down their disputes thus avoiding a third American intervention.⁷⁶

In 1921 Alfredo Zayas, a scholar, was elected president. The U.S. Special Envoy⁷⁷ Enoch Crowder suggested cabinet ministers and other policies, as condition for avoiding another intervention. Zayas successfully maneuvered throughout this period, including peacefully settling an internal revolt⁷⁸ and passed the government on to Machado, elected in 1925.

General Machado⁷⁹ constitutes an interesting case study. A modernizer, he implemented a statist and nationalistic economic model similar to that which contemporaries Ibáñez, in Chile, Vargas, in Brazil, Calles and Cárdenas, in Mexico, were also implementing.⁸⁰ Machado changed the constitution to re-elect himself triggering a radical revolution that triumphed in 1933⁸¹ and significantly changed Cuban future politics and politicians.

Beginning with Machado, Cuba endured several autocratic presidents,⁸² whose efforts to control the country and remain in power, were supported by a nationalistic discourse, economic development and public works. In each case we can identify a similar pattern:

1. Government controls the political machine. Machado used *cooperativismo*, where all parties would share Congress; Batista used an activist army, with educational and economic functions, in addition to military. Both followed the *caudillo* model, similar to Italian Fascism, characteristic of the 1920s and 1930s. Finally, Castro abolished all political life, and created a one-party, Soviet-style socialist state.⁸³
2. Government then develops necessary and useful economic programs

to gain public support: Machado built *Carretera Central*, Capitolio, Malecón, Universidad, Hotel Nacional, and fostered industrialization through *aranceles proteccionistas of 1927*; Batista fostered education via *Maestros Sargentos* and *Escuelas Cívico-Militares*,⁸⁴ three-year economic plans, hospitals (*Maternidad Obrera*, *Topes de Collantes*); and Castro developed an entire socialist scheme, extending health, labor and education programs beyond large urban centers and for all social classes, while nationalizing private property and dismantling most organizations of Cuba's pre-1959 civil society.

3. Opposition, dislodged by government, instead of negotiating fights and/or seek U.S. support. Machado provoked the 1930-33 revolution,⁸⁵ and was initially substituted through *la mediación*⁸⁶ of U.S. Special Envoy Sumner Welles. Batista,⁸⁷ with military and U.S. support controlled violent insurgencies⁸⁸ after 1933. He returned to power in a 1952 coup.⁸⁹ All civic efforts to find negotiated solutions⁹⁰ failed, leading to violent struggle⁹¹ and to the 1959 revolution. Castro banned all forms of opposition, and all political parties, controlled the media and the economy, and his rivals were jailed or went abroad, where activities such as the Bay of Pigs attack were organized.
4. After the government falls, the programs from its administration are denounced and abandoned, administration officials (efficient or incompetent) are replaced, and the cycle repeats. After Machado, intellectuals of the caliber of Orestes Ferrara and Ramiro Guerra; after Batista, in 1944, programs such as the *Topes de Collantes* hospital, the *Escuelas-Cívico Militares* and *Maestros-Sargentos*; and under Castro, most programs created before his revolution were discarded or abandoned. Such inefficient government succession policies can only produce waste, and prevent or delay Cuba's badly-needed socioeconomic development.⁹²

Only three civilian presidents governed Cuba during 1920-1959: Zayas, Grau and Prio.⁹³ All showed serious corruption problems, but respected civil rights and negotiated with their opposition. In general, political parties had short lives and depended more on their leaders' charisma, than on specific programs.⁹⁴ In addition, part of Cuba's middle classes shied away from actively participating in national politics,⁹⁵ concentrating instead on more profitable activities,⁹⁶ thus leaving public affairs to professional politicians.⁹⁷

In spite of the above problems, and by the grace of God and the talent and hard work of many, Cuba improved, inch by inch. Every government,⁹⁸ however corrupt, left some good: *Enmienda Platt* was finally abolished; Cuba built a highly recognized university, whose roster of

intellectuals and professionals is too long to list; its artists and athletes are world-renowned. The Cuba of 1958 (as well as that of 2012) is, by far, much better than that of 1902. Cubans are the proud children of all those heroes that preceded them, and were able to achieve so much, with so little, and under more adverse conditions.⁹⁹

Discussion

We derive no pleasure in criticizing our Cuban co-nationals, from all quadrants of the current conundrum. This is not an exercise in catharsis, either. We pursue a very practical objective akin to that of AA:¹⁰⁰ first recognize a problem; then, define a process to fix it.

We see the Cuban problem as having three components: *government, opposition and philosophy*.¹⁰¹ The group holding (1) *the government*, wants to preserve it indefinitely, by neutralizing or thwarting the opposition.¹⁰² Those in (2) *the opposition*, believe the way to power is to use violence to replace, and then ostracize, those in government;¹⁰³ and when 1 & 2 fail, to seek external support, usually from the US. Finally, the (3) *philosophy of mutual exclusion*,¹⁰⁴ used by both, government and opposition, which fails because it precludes the possibility of *negotiating*, and of *incorporating* the positive policies and the competent people, from the previous administration, once these are out of power.

There are two main issues that hinder or delay the solution of the Cuban problem. First, Cubans have been traditionally concerned with foreign (US) intervention in their internal affairs.¹⁰⁵ On the other hand, and like any other world power, the US promotes what they believe to be their best national interests. Given Cuba's proximity to the US, and its strategic position in the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean, the US has an understandable interest in Cuba. Recognizing this fact is just common sense, and *Realpolitik*.

Therefore, it is the responsibility of the Cuban government, the opposition, and the general population, especially the educated classes, to conduct a policy that avoids foreign intervention. And it is the responsibility of the US government to respect the Cuban sovereignty. Many years ago, Ambassador Manuel Márquez-Sterling expressed this truth in no uncertain terms.¹⁰⁶

Secondly, the Cuban government needs to open a space for the opposition, and the opposition must use it judiciously, to negotiate with the government. Systems that have successfully transitioned from totalitarianism to pluralism, such as Brazil, Mexico, Chile and Spain, have allowed a space for, and negotiated with the opposition.¹⁰⁷ And systems that have failed to do so (USSR, DDR) have imploded. It is the responsibility of the government, the strongest of the contenders, to

allow the development of such a space.

Summarizing, a successful solution for the current Cuban impasse requires that all parties (1) exercise tolerance, and (2) negotiate their differences (3) in an appropriate space. In the next section we overview three successful examples of such mutual accommodation, and of the corresponding negotiating strategies.

Several Transition Examples

In the 1960s the military in Brazil, concerned with Marxist advances in the region, and fearing that such a regime could also emerge in their country, staged a coup and installed a dictatorship under the cover of a two-party democracy.¹⁰⁸ They dissolved old political parties and created the MDB,¹⁰⁹ which included the opposition. In it, those outside of (or in disagreement with) the establishment could find a space and a voice, no matter how timid or restricted. Thus, the government left some room, however constrained and controlled, for part of the opposition to congregate and grow leaders, with whom the government could conduct conversations. Such a space eventually fostered the transition.

In 1985, support for the government declined, while that for the MDB and opposition forces increased. The ensuing transition process, that took over 15 years, started with the election of a new administration.¹¹⁰ There were severe disagreements and serious issues to surmount. But there was no foreign country, which could be perceived by either side as imposing a solution or favoring a specific group, meddling in such process. Neither Portugal, the OAS, or any other nation, imposed Brazil a time-table or a schedule.

Readers familiar with the Spanish transition (1975-1985) following Franco's death will recognize similar characteristics, resulting from a clear desire to negotiate a transition. The rigid group that directed Franco's government after the Spanish Civil War of 1936-39 was, during the 1960s, gradually substituted by that of Laureano López-Rodó and his economic team. They started a series of political, social and economic reforms¹¹¹ that fostered, after the death of General Franco, the transition of 1975. Again, there was no foreign country interfering in the process, which could be perceived by either side as imposing a solution, or favoring a specific group. The European Union did not impose a time-schedule, or any other pre-conditions, to the Spanish transition.

In Mexico,¹¹² a similar situation resulted with the PRI,¹¹³ created by General Calles¹¹⁴ in 1929.¹¹⁵ PRI system developed further under President Cárdenas¹¹⁶ with the creation of conservative PAN,¹¹⁷ the loyal opposition. In the 1980s, left-wing PRD¹¹⁸ was formed. In both of these, albeit supervised and controlled and with scant possibilities of

attaining real power, those outside the establishment found a space to congregate and operate.

The Mexican political system¹¹⁹ functioned under very singular, unwritten rules that made it quite unique and ensured its domination (*hegemonía*) for over seventy years.¹²⁰ PRI's presidential candidate (*El Tapado*) was selected and announced (*El Dedazo*) by the retiring president, a few months before an election that would anoint him. Such candidate (1) could not be a relative or surrogate of the departing president;¹²¹ (2) could not lobby for the position;¹²² (3) should be from the alternative wing of the PRI;¹²³ (4) would inherit the absolute power with full command;¹²⁴ (5) would receive total support from all PRI corporations,¹²⁵ and (5) the Mexican army would support and ensure this scheme, but would not otherwise or directly partake in the political process.¹²⁶

It is worth noticing how several pernicious effects, common in Latin American dictatorial or authoritarian regimes were avoided by the PRI. For example the president, who was actually all-powerful for six years, could never be re-elected. He could not leave a proxy during his absence, later to return to become behind the throne power.¹²⁷ For, under the PRI, departing presidents would usually leave the country for several years, so the new ones could build their own power base, to return (if at all) years later to occupy some nominal and powerless position.¹²⁸ The army, contrary to their behavior in most of Latin America, did not impose a candidate or staged a coup. And PRI presidential successions occurred periodically and peacefully, as opposed to the bloody ones after lengthy periods of personal power, such as occurred in Russia, China,¹²⁹ or Eastern Europe.

By the end of the XX Century, having fostered an urban middle class that pressured for a political and economic opening, the PRI system finally wore out. With the supervision of uncommitted, international observers from several countries,¹³⁰ a really free election was finally held in 2000. The PRI lost the presidency to PAN, then peacefully moved aside.

Lessons gained from the Transition Examples

There are three common features in these successful transitions. First, the government does not corner the opposition: it leaves a space, however small and controlled, for its participation. And it allows such space to grow, albeit reluctantly, with time. Secondly, both government and opposition work inside the system, avoiding asymmetric foreign intrusion. Third, a sense of *Realpolitik* prevails among all sectors involved. Neither side tries to annihilate the other, which allows evolution and negotiation. In addition, the presence of unbiased multinational

observers, can serve as catalysts and guarantors of the process. Such occurred, for example, in Central America, in the 1980s, with the *Grupo Contadora*,¹³¹ or in Mexico, in 2000, with the international election observers.

In all three examples provided above, the incumbent governments eventually lost popular support. Then the opposition, using the alternative space provided to them, instead of the annihilation of the government, negotiated a peaceful change, thus avoiding civil war, as occurred in Spain (1936-39), or a foreign intervention, as in Dominican Republic (1965).

Raúl Castro, who is in his eighties, in 2006 substituted his ailing older brother Fidel, who governed Cuba for half a century.¹³² Raúl has implemented interesting economic¹³³ and political¹³⁴ changes.¹³⁵ He knows he has little time to pass into Cuban History, either as a failed Marcelo Caetano, or a successful Arias Navarro.¹³⁶ By unilaterally imposing a time table and a schedule for change, the US government will only provide excuses to hard-liners within the Cuban regime that do not want change. This will only delay that Cuba evolves, at its own pace, into an open society, just as Brazil, Spain and Mexico did.

The opposition, that we prefer to call the alternative, has also evolved in tune with the transition examples discussed here. The *old guard*, both in Havana and Miami, are disappearing for biological reasons, leaving a more pragmatic and younger group in their place. Inside Cuba, a broad scope of small, uncoordinated, dissident groups give voice to the popular discontent. The Catholic Church has taken upon itself, with the tacit approval of the current Cuban government, the role of loyal opposition.¹³⁷ Other organizations¹³⁸ that in the past were actively involved in Cuban life, are not participating at this time.¹³⁹

There exist, since the late 1990s, a group of Cuban intellectuals, formed in the revolution. Some have stayed in the island.¹⁴⁰ Others, living abroad, take an independent and critical position *vis-à-vis* the leadership, both inside the island as well as in exile.¹⁴¹ One important example of such independent intellectual writing abroad was Jesus Díaz.¹⁴²

Another such example is Rafael Rojas, who grew up in Cuba, then studied in Mexico and remains there. His essay *La otra moral de la teleología cubana* (Rojas 1994) "announces the return of the liberal thought into the national stage."¹⁴³ Another Rojas (2006:102) essay, *Tumbas sin sosiego*, contrasts the Republican Pact between Cuban intellectuals, during the 1940s and 1950s, whereby three ideological currents (Catholic, republican and socialist) coexisted and disagreed with civility, with the official, autocratic policy toward intellectuals and their production, instated after the 1960 revolution.

The new ideas and writings of these intellectuals about Cuba's

problems and its future¹⁴⁴ are also espoused by many Cubans, both in the island and abroad. Slowly, and by taking timid steps, the government and internal and external alternatives (opposition, dissidence, diaspora) are starting to move in the direction of convergence.

Conclusions

Through several examples presented and discussed in this paper, we have shown how intolerance encourages lack of cooperation between government and opposition, creating unwelcome opportunities for asymmetric participation and foreign intervention. The combination of these ingredients, in turn, gives rise to an inefficient, recurrent political model, composed of three stages: (1) a group inappropriately attains power, then destroys or neutralizes the existing opposition; (2) the displaced opposition either turns to violence and/or seeks foreign support, to dislodge the new government; when it (3) finally reaches power, either through foreign support or through violence, it discontinues previously created economic programs and substitutes all officers from the previous administration.

Then, the entire process repeats itself. This paradigm is observed in the Machado and Batista dictatorships, as well as in some other Spanish Caribbean ones.¹⁴⁵ And it may well be the paradigm to be followed, to terminate the Castro brothers' regime.

Our proposed solution consists in persuading the Cuban government to (1) open a space for the opposition; then, (2) for all parties to use it as a framework to negotiate their differences, (3) without foreign interference, that may create asymmetric opponents.

Such a solution will certainly take time, patience, good will, and possibly international support, of the type that the *Contadora Group* provided Central America, in the 1980s.

The skeptical will say that there is no way to persuade the Castro regime without external force. And thence the need for embargos, pre-conditions, etc., such as the ones currently in place by the US government. However, we do have seen some changes in the Cuban regime, responding to economic circumstances, since the loss of the Soviet subsidies in 1990. The Cuba of 2015 resembles very little the Cuba of the 1980s. The older generation of Castro's regime, just as the older generation of Franco's regime, has siblings to protect from a general collapse. This is the real force behind a transition in Cuba.

But, if the Cuban government remains unwilling to (1) open a space and (2) negotiate with its alternative groups, it will end up as Spain did, at the end of the XIX Century, when it refused to negotiate a solution for the colonial status of Cuba and Puerto Rico.

If the Cuban opposition, inside and abroad, fails to negotiate with the government and instead seeks foreign backing to overthrow it, Cuba will end up as it did, after its Independence War of 1895: with a Republic like that of 1902.

Finally, if the US government unilaterally places pre-conditions and specific demands to the Cuban government,¹⁴⁶ and supports specific opposition groups, as occurred in Iraq and Afghanistan, Cuba may return to the conditions that produced its 1959 revolution, and that helped to keep such revolutionary government in power, for over fifty years.

The intelligence and ability of all conundrum participants, will determine the final outcome of Cuba, in the XXI Century.

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Notes

- ¹ A shorter, working version of this paper was presented to the 2012 ASCE Conference, Miami FL.
- ² Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy: <<http://www.ascecuba.org/>> (Accessed X/30/13).
- ³ Within the context of this paper, *Tolerance* implies that one is willing and/or able to listen and understand the views of others, especially when they differ from our own. And that one is willing and able to *negotiate* them with others, especially with those who hold opposite views. *Intolerance* is the opposite.
- ⁴ When the intolerance of a faction, within a political party, forced the US government shut-down.
- ⁵ Which created the 1965 American Civil Rights legislation, as well as Medicare.
- ⁶ Gold, silver, copper, among others. Mexico, Peru, Bolivia and Colombia had such precious metals.
- ⁷ *La Flota* carried silver and gold from Peru and Mexico, silk and species from Philippines. Guerra (1925).

- ⁸ A cultural rather than geographical classification, which includes Spanish possessions in, and around, the Caribbean Sea. Especially Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic, have always maintained a close historical and human relationship. See Martínez-Fernández (1994), Arciniegas (1966), and Romeu (2005).
- ⁹ Usually, anything further than a few miles away from Havana is called *el interior*, or *el campo*.
- ¹⁰ Freebooters and buccaneers traded beef, hides and other agricultural products for flour, species, clothes, hardware. Bayamo, a smuggling center, became rich on such trade. Smuggling was also common in Santo Domingo, to the point that its governor was ordered by the King to burn all towns on the west of the island (today's Haiti), and to bring to the eastern part all Spanish colonists living there, thus facilitating its French colonization. See Franco-Pichardo (2002), Dorsainvil (1975), Evans-Smith (1985), Maso (1998).
- ¹¹ Campomanes, Floridablanca and Aranda, among the most capable. See Comellas (1985).
- ¹² Known as "Guerra de los Siete Años" in Europe, Spain and Latin America. Comellas, *ibid*.
- ¹³ Spain regained Florida from the British after aiding Americans in their Independence War. Maso, *ibid*.
- ¹⁴ Riela, Bucarely, de la Torre, Navarro and finally Luis de Las Casas. See Márquez-Sterling (1975).
- ¹⁵ Saint Domingue, later Haiti, was the richest French colony in the XVIII Century. Evans-Smith (1985).
- ¹⁶ French colonists in Haiti claimed citizenship rights. But so did poor whites, free mulattos, and finally, black slaves. The revolution destroyed the Haitian economy and dispersed whites all over the Caribbean.
- ¹⁷ Santo Domingo, today the Dominican Republic, was possibly the most impacted. It first suffered the invasions of Toussaint L'Ouverture and later, that of Leclerc. Ensuing wars fostered mass exodus of its Spanish population. In 1822 Haiti invaded it, and annexed it, until 1844 that it obtained its independence from that country—and not Spain like all other Spanish colonies. After that, under constant fear of another Haitian invasion, it sought annexation to several countries until, in 1860, it became again Spanish for five years. After that, it went its own way, but always keeping in touch

with its sister islands through the actions of figures as Hostos, Puerto Rican educator, and Máximo Gómez, Dominican hero of Cuban independence.

- ¹⁸ Freemasonry was introduced in the Caribbean—and expanded in the USA—via French-Haitian émigrés.
- ¹⁹ Thus called, because of their extraordinary production of sugar cane, possible through the African slave labor. For statistics of production and slave population, see Rogozinski (2000), and Williams (1994).
- ²⁰ Also known as *Manifest Destiny*. Guerra (1964); visit <<http://www.ushistory.org/us/29.asp>> (XI/22/13).
- ²¹ Jefferson gave, in 1809, the following advice in a letter to President Madison: “we will raise a column in the southernmost part of Cuba, with an inscription: *Ne Plus Ultra*.” Foner (1962). Also see Douglas (2005).
- ²² Which included proposals to Spain to buy the island, encouragement to pro-annexation groups, pursuing war against Spain to help Cuban independence, and military occupation of the island. Foner, Guerra, *ibid*.
- ²³ Some times called *integrisimo* or *reformismo*, becoming a part (i.e., province) of continental Spain.
- ²⁴ Incorporation of Cuba to the United States, or to other Caribbean country such as Colombia or Mexico.
- ²⁵ Spanish territory, but governed by an insular parliament and special laws, such as Canada is to the UK.
- ²⁶ Work in progress: small Cuba has seldom been able to resist the influence of a large, close United States.
- ²⁷ Generals Maceo, Moncada and Banderas were darker-skinned (mulatto and free black) Cubans, born and raised in the island. This contrasted with recently-arrived African slaves, who didn't speak Spanish.
- ²⁸ The War of 1868-78, fought only in the Eastern part of Cuba, failed. In the Western part of the island, the large number of recently-brought African slaves created a concern in many Cubans, of a repeat of the 1795 Haitian slave revolt. Such was not a large concern in Eastern Cuba. The War of 1895 succeeded only after breaching the military *Trocha de Morón*, which divided East and West, thus extending the war to Havana.

- ²⁹ England underwent its own with Cromwell, in the mid XVII Century; and the French, one century later.
- ³⁰ Possibly for fear of losing them, as they had already lost all their other American colonies.
- ³¹ Under the status of *Plaza Sitiada*, Cuba's Governor General was the all-powerful authority in the island.
- ³² *La más preciada joya*; Spanish saying of the XIX Century, regarding the colonial possession of Cuba.
- ³³ Arango later recanted such policy of inundating the island with African slaves.
- ³⁴ See Alvarez Díaz *et al.* (1964); Martínez-Fernández, *ibid*; Moreno Fragnals (1976); Marrero (1981).
- ³⁵ See Shelton (1993); Remos (1958); Moreno Fragnals (2002); McCadden (2001); Guerra (1925).
- ³⁶ *Caminos; y Causas de la Vagancia en Cuba*. Saco also edited *Revista Bimestre*. See Arroyo (1989).
- ³⁷ For which he was deported by Cuba's Captain General (Spanish Governor) Miguel Tacon. Maso, *Ibid*.
- ³⁸ Luz is the pioneer of Cuba's education in the XIX Century. See Shelton (1993); Remos (1958);
- ³⁹ Institutions created by King Carlos III in all Spanish domains, to foster socioeconomic development.
- ⁴⁰ See Remos, *Ibid*; Gjelten (2008); Ortiz (1973); Bizcarrondo and Alorza (2001), Maso, *Ibid*.
- ⁴¹ Spain looked at Cuba's landed and educated classes as dangerous separatists, and used slavery as a tool, to instill in them the fear of an African revolt, and keep Cubans docile. Moreno Fragnals (1976).
- ⁴² The expedition of Narciso López, for example, landed in Cárdenas in 1850, and in Pinar del Río in 1851, without winning support from the local population, mostly indifferent to the insurrection. Maso, *Ibid*.
- ⁴³ His epitaph reads: "Aqui yace José Antonio Saco, que no fue anexionista, porque fue más cubano que todos los anexionistas". Alvarez Díaz *et al.*, *ibid*; Rexach (1991); Saco (2001, see especially the preface).
- ⁴⁴ *Papeles Políticos sobre Cuba*, is a collection of Saco's political writings (Saco, 2001).

- ⁴⁵ As had occurred in Texas in 1836 and would occur in New Mexico and California (1848). Guerra (1964).
- ⁴⁶ Political and social development in both islands ran in parallel, during the XIX Century, with adjustments for Cuba being larger and richer than Puerto Rico. See Da. Lola Rodríguez de Tió's famous poem: *A Cuba*.
- ⁴⁷ Many Puerto Rican delegates to the Spanish *Cortes* were also *autonomistas*. For more on *autonomismo* in Cuba and Puerto Rico, see Bizcarrondo and Elorza (2001), J.A. Ayala (1991), and Soucy (2009).
- ⁴⁸ Timid steps toward a parliamentary monarchy were taken in Spain, after the *pronunciamientos* of 1833, 1844, 1854, 1868 and 1873. It was not until the *Restauración* of 1875 that such appeared. Comellas, *ibid*.
- ⁴⁹ A Cuban saying about Spanish politicians was: *son liberales en España, pero españoles en América*.
- ⁵⁰ Such as Céspedes, Agramonte, Aguilera, Cisneros, and other *Criollo* large land owners and intellectuals.
- ⁵¹ Such as Máximo Gómez, Calixto García, Vicente García, and other white ranchers and farmers.
- ⁵² Such as the Maceos, Moncada, Banderas, and other free black and mulatto small farmers and artisans.
- ⁵³ Zanjón Treaty (1878) recognized the freedom of slaves incorporated in the rebel army. After that, it was nonsensical to maintain slavery any further. In 1880, a series of laws were passed that freed them all. By then, most slaves were already born in Cuba, as slave trade had slowly grinded to a halt after the 1844 slave *Conspiración de La Escalera*. Chinese and Yucateco indented servants substituted the slaves. Immigration of Gallego and Canario farmers, was also fostered to increase labor. Guerra (1925); Maso, *ibid*.
- ⁵⁴ *Partido Liberal Autonomista*, advocated internal self-government, and *Unión Constitucional*, advocated permanent union with Spain, and representation only as a province, in Madrid's *Cortes*. Bizcarrondo, *ibid*.
- ⁵⁵ Many *Autoctonous Freemasons* in Cuba and Puerto Rico became leaders of their Liberal Parties, and founded the respective Grand Lodges. Soucy, *ibid* and Bizcarrondo and Elorza, *ibid*. Ayala, *ibid*.

- ⁵⁶ Period between the two independence wars: 1880 to 1895, with active, peaceful political engagement
- ⁵⁷ Similar pro-autonomy parties arose in Cuba and Puerto Rico, after 1880, but their plight was ignored.
- ⁵⁸ Saco sought for Cuba an autonomic state, with an insular parliament, such as Canada had from Britain. Spain finally set up autonomous governments in Cuba and Puerto Rico, in January of 1898, when Cuba was destroyed by three years of war and a clash with the United States was unavoidable. See Bizcarrondo, *ibid*.
- ⁵⁹ Between Weiler's *Reconcentración* and Máximo Gómez' *tea incendiaria*, Cuba was largely destroyed.
- ⁶⁰ Some Spaniards stated that *it was honorable to lose a war to the Americans, but not to Máximo Gómez*. Cubans would have not destroyed the Spanish fleet, or taken the Philippines; only demanded independence!
- ⁶¹ Martí, Betances and Hostos, among others, sought such a federation. See Romeu-Fernández (1959).
- ⁶² British suzerainty provided Jamaica with the political status that has protected it from enduring foreign interventions, an advantage that other *independent* Caribbean nations have not enjoyed.
- ⁶³ "(...) de impedir a tiempo, con la independencia de Cuba, que se extiendan por las Antillas los EEUU." Dos Ríos, V/18/1895. <<http://www.granma.cubaweb.cu/marti-moncada/col-05.html>>. Accedida VIII/5/12.
- ⁶⁴ Conventional wisdom during the *Convención Constituyente de 1901*, regarding the approval of *Enmienda Platt* was: *más vale una república a medias, que ninguna república*. See Portell, Ch. 2 (1986), Maso, *ibid*.
- ⁶⁵ Platt Amendment gave the United States the right to intervene in Cuban politics, to safeguard American life and property, as well as the Naval Base of Guantánamo. Portell, Ch. 2, *ibid*. *Encyclopedia Britannica*.
- ⁶⁶ Exercise known in American politics as *horse trading*, which is the basis for parliamentary democracy.
- ⁶⁷ Cuban politicians, unlike American ones, have never learned that *politics ends at the water's edge*.
- ⁶⁸ Had these always maintained the level of involvement they have kept after 1959, when their economic interests were affected by the

revolution, contemporary Cuban history might have been totally different.

- ⁶⁹ Some times militarily, as in the Second Intervention (1906-09) or through the threat of an intervention (as in 1912, 1917, 1923). Franklin D. Roosevelt, elected in 1933, substituted Theodore Roosevelt's policy of the *Big Stick* by the *Good Neighbor*, whereby instead of the U.S. Marines, diplomatic pressures were used, as with Crowder, in 1920, and with Summer Wells, in 1933. Guerra (1964), Portell, Ch.4, *ibid*, Maso, *ibid*.
- ⁷⁰ Marines then landed and the US took again over the Cuban government. Portell, Ch. 3, *ibid*.
- ⁷¹ General José Miguel Gómez, Liberal *caudillo* of the War of 1895, was elected. Portell, Ch. 5, *ibid*.
- ⁷² Charles Magoon American interventionist administration encouraged black leaders Ivonet and Estenoz to organize a racially-based political party, totally forbidden by (black Senator) *Morua Law*. Insistence on this issue brought armed clashes between blacks and Gómez' government. We note, in passing, how Magoon's proposition came from a nation that tolerated *Jim Crow's laws, and black lynchings*, in the South.
- ⁷³ *La Guerrita de los Negros* took place in Camagüey and Oriente provinces. U.S. Marine units were ready to land, had the Cuban government been unable to control the insurrection. Portell, Ch. 5, *ibid*.
- ⁷⁴ American-trained engineer and 1895 War General. He governed between 1913-21. Portell, Ch. 5, *ibid*.
- ⁷⁵ *La Chambelona*, the 1917 Liberal armed revolt in Camagüey and Oriente provinces. Portell, Ch. 5, *ibid*.
- ⁷⁶ Cubans were terrified with the possibility of a *Third Time Charm* intervention, that could become final.
- ⁷⁷ This situation was not unusual at the time in the Caribbean basin countries. See Vasconcelos (1998).
- ⁷⁸ The *Movimiento de Veteranos y Patriotas* uprising in Las Villas, in 1923. See Portell, Ch. 5, *ibid*.
- ⁷⁹ Gerardo Machado, a Liberal 1895 War General from Las Villas, was the first president to create efficient policies to develop Cuban industry. For his side of the story, see Machado (1982). Also, Portell, Ch. 5, *ibid*.

- ⁸⁰ For a XX Century account of Latin American history, see Dabene (2000) among other authors.
- ⁸¹ Marking the end of Cuba's First (Aristocratic) Republic (of Generals and Doctors).
- ⁸² Machado (1925-33), Batista (1933-44, 1952-58), and Fidel-Raúl Castro (1959-present). See Portell, *ibid.*
- ⁸³ Marking the end of Cuba's Second (Bourgeois) Republic, and the start of the socialist one.
- ⁸⁴ *Military boarding schools*, such as Ceiba del Agua, provided scholarships for the education of poor and rural students. *Teacher Sargents* took public education to the remotest regions of the countryside.
- ⁸⁵ Armed and violent opposition groups, developed by organizations such as ABC, OCRR, DR-AIE-FEU.
- ⁸⁶ Welles pressured the Cuban army, and Machado resigned. A short-lived interim government was created. Non-commissioned officers and left-wing students then overthrew this government, creating *la Pentarquía* (five-member collective presidency that resigned after five days), never recognized by the US government.
- ⁸⁷ Governed indirectly, as Chief of the Army (1933-39), and then directly, as president (1940-44).
- ⁸⁸ *Grupos de acción* from the 1933 revolution include ABC (revolted at Castillo de Atares); *Joven Cuba* (sabotages in 1934-35), and *Communists* (strike, 1935). They were all suppressed by Batista and his Army. After the 1944 election of President Grau, several reorganized, creating an atmosphere of gangsterism.
- ⁸⁹ Staged after eight years of corrupt but democratic and liberal governments, and US government blessing.
- ⁹⁰ Cosme de la Torriente's *civic dialogue*, in 1956; Márquez-Sterling's *third party*, in the 1958 election.
- ⁹¹ Moncada, Goicuría and Palacio Presidencial attacks, Cienfuegos military revolt and finally guerrillas in the mountains, organized by M-16-7, DR/FEU, OA, Segundo Frente, and other revolutionary movements.
- ⁹² A similar waste paradigm may also be identified in several other countries of the Caribbean basin.
- ⁹³ We did not consider *La Pentarquía* (1933), which was unacceptable to the US government, nor interim presidencies of Grau, Mendieta,

Barnet, Gómez, or Laredo Bru, between 1933 and 1940. They were either short-lived, or just figureheads under the influence or control of General Batista. See Portell Ch. 6, *ibid*.

- ⁹⁴ One exception was the well-organized PSP (socialist/communist party) who had stable leadership, local activists, and a clear (Marxist) ideology. PSP also operated a national newspaper and a radio station.
- ⁹⁵ A popular saying of the times was: *Las personas decentes no se meten en política*.
- ⁹⁶ During 1910-29, fancy upper and middle class neighborhoods were built in Havana (Vedado, Miramar, Country Club). In 1940-59, more neighborhoods were developed (Biltmore, Nuevo Vedado, Tarará, Santa María, Varadero) that illustrate the middle class new economic power. Romeu (2011). Portell, Ch. 7. *Ibid*.
- ⁹⁷ Two mottoes, one American and one Cuban, explain it all: *you get what you pay for*. And *aquellos polvos trajeron estos lodos*. Such lack of interest in public affairs, by many, later brought much grievance to Cuba.
- ⁹⁸ Including the current one, which extended employment, medical and educational services to all citizens.
- ⁹⁹ The other two Spanish Caribbean islands also struggled in their own ways: Dominican Republic under the Trujillo dictatorship (1930-61) and Puerto Rico, a US commonwealth, under Muñoz Marín (1948-64). The frequent movement of populations and civic leaders between them attest to their continuous relation.
- ¹⁰⁰ Alcoholic Anonymous, a self-help group that rehabilitates former alcoholics, using inner-strength.
- ¹⁰¹ These three components discussion only pertains to the political situation in Cuba during 1902-1959. It is based upon historical events, and is not intended to include any other Latin American country.
- ¹⁰² This happened in 1906 when President Estrada Palma rigged his re-election on his favor; also in 1917, with President García Menocal, and in 1929, with President Machado, when both rigged their re-elections.
- ¹⁰³ In 1906, the Liberals resorted to an armed revolt against Estrada Palma; in 1917 the Liberals resorted to another armed revolt, against García Menocal, and in 1930-33, the opposition resorted to urban warfare and armed revolt in the country side, against Machado,

when said Presidents were re-elected fraudulently. Gen. Batista, in 1952, resorted to a military coup approved by the US government, because he would not win the Presidency in democratic elections. In turn, an armed insurgency against Batista was the response of a citizenry that miss-trusted the government and could not believe in the possibility of a peaceful solution.

- ¹⁰⁴ Many politicians and highly trained government officers of the above-mentioned ousted administrations were ostracized or went into political exile. Cuba thence missed their valuable contributions. Few examples include Ferrara and Guerra after Machado, Felipe Pazos and López Fresquet after Batista's coup, thousands of middle class professionals, technicians and entrepreneurs, that left after 1959 (Pedraza 2007).
- ¹⁰⁵ Concerns of US military intervention (effective in 1906-09, after the Liberal insurgency against Estrada Palma) kept at bay political confrontation (e.g 1912, 1917, 1923, 1933) as already discussed in our paper.
- ¹⁰⁶ *Contra la ingerencia extraña, la virtud doméstica*. Márquez-Sterling (2005).
- ¹⁰⁷ For more comparisons of the Spanish, Brazilian and Chilean transitions, with Cuba, see Romeu (2009).
- ¹⁰⁸ Proyecto Geisel-Golbery. For details of this historical period, see Ferreira and Almeida (2003).
- ¹⁰⁹ *Movimento Democrático Brasileiro*, only opposition organization allowed. It included leaders such as Neves, Guimaraes, Richa, Montoro and Henrique Cardoso, who eventually facilitated the transition.
- ¹¹⁰ Tancredo Neves prematurely died, and was substituted by Sarney. See Ferreira and Almeida, *ibid*.
- ¹¹¹ Such as the return of many political and *Civil War exiles*, and the *Ley de Asociaciones*. As a result, *political clubs* were allowed, and future government President Felipe González never had to go into exile.
- ¹¹² For a brief but accurate account of Mexican history, see Cossio-Villegas (1983), and Krause (1987).
- ¹¹³ *Partido Revolucionario Institucional* (1929) aka *Partido de la Revolución Mexicana*. In spite of many serious problems (e.g. corruption, violence, manipulation) PRI successfully ended revolutionary violence and fostered the stability and socioeconomic growth of

contemporary Mexico. See Romeu (2000, 2001).

- ¹¹⁴ For more on Madero, Calles, Obregón and Cárdenas, see the series *Los Caudillos*, by Krauze (1987).
- ¹¹⁵ PRI roots could be traced to the Calles-Obregón understanding of 1920, when these two revolutionary generals agreed to alternate in the presidency, and implement advanced socioeconomic programs such as land redistribution, expansion of public education, restriction of the Catholic Church influence, etc.
- ¹¹⁶ Lázaro Cárdenas, one of Mexico's most important political leaders, was president from 1934 to 1940.
- ¹¹⁷ *Partido Acción Nacional* was founded in 1940 by Manuel Gómez Morín, a former Calles Minister. For more on Gómez Morín, and a comparison with his Cuban counterpart, Jorge Mañach, see Romeu (2003).
- ¹¹⁸ *Partido de la Revolución Mexicana*, a splinter of the PRI founded in 1988 by Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas and Muñoz Ledo, two former cabinet members under PRI governments. It is currently the 3rd political force.
- ¹¹⁹ It brought stability to Mexico after twenty years of revolution. Its rules addressed several problems that had plagued Mexican politics: succession, nepotism and party bickering that allowed foreign intervention.
- ¹²⁰ PAN had federal Senators and Congressmen since the 1960s, and governors since the 1980s. It won the Presidency in 2000, and again in 2006. The PRI party recuperated the presidency in the 2012 free elections.
- ¹²¹ This precludes Nepotism, an endemic disease of Latin American politics, including Cuba. An example is the poisoning, in 1945, of General Maximino Ávila Camacho, hopeful heir brother of the sitting president.
- ¹²² A popular Mexican saying regarding lobbying is: *El que se mueve, no sale en la foto*.
- ¹²³ PRI is a *non-ideological* party, sort of coalition of national forces. Examples of such policy: left-leaning Cárdenas was followed by conservative Ávila Camacho, who was then followed by Liberal Alemán. The alternating turns ensure stability, by not moving too fast or too much in any direction, splitting the coalition.

- ¹²⁴ Departing presidents would usually leave Mexico, some times for many years, not returning until they were no longer a threat to the sitting president, to occupy an honorary and non-threatening position.
- ¹²⁵ An exception occurred in 1988, when *LaQuina*, the head of PEMEX Union, refused to pay homage to Salinas, the new president. *LaQuina's* home was stormed by the army, and he was arrested and jailed.
- ¹²⁶ There have been no military coups in Mexico in seventy years, since the PRI system was inaugurated.
- ¹²⁷ As Trujillo did in the Dominican Republic, during the 1940s and 1950s, with his brother and several other puppets; or more recently, as Putin did in Russia, with his former Prime Minister.
- ¹²⁸ For example, Ex-President LaMadrid became the head of *Editorial Fondo de Cultura Económica*.
- ¹²⁹ Recall the transitions after Lenin, Stalin, Jruschov and Breshnev, in the URSS, or after Mao, in China.
- ¹³⁰ Such role, as opposed to the pressures from a single, interested country, pursuing an active agenda.
- ¹³¹ *Grupo Contadora*: initiative organized by the foreign ministers of Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela and Panama, to help resolve the military conflicts occurring in El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua, during the 1980s. <<http://eleconomista.com.mx/sociedad/2013/01/09/grupo-contadora-trascendental-america>>.
- ¹³² For more on Raúl Castro, and his possible role in a Transition, see Romeu (2008, 2009b).
- ¹³³ For details of Raúl Castro's changes, their extent, problems and their consequences, see *The Economist* (2012), as well as the papers of Carmelo Mesa Lago (2011 and 2012).
- ¹³⁴ Raúl has experimented, for the first time since 1959, strong (if passive) resistance from hard line sectors of the Communist Party, opposing his proposed economic changes. See Jorge Domínguez (2012).
- ¹³⁵ The jury is still out regarding the extent and depth of Raúl Castro's reforms, who said that he was not elected "to oversee the dissolution of the Cuban socialist system." Rafael Rojas writes in *El País* (2013a): "Negar que en Cuba se está produciendo una transformación de la economía y la sociedad sólo puede responder al propósito

de construir ficciones oficiales u opositoras. Desde los 90, Cuba se mueve en la dirección del mercado y el pluralismo, y esa tendencia no ha hecho más que acelerarse con las medidas de los dos últimos años.” Rojas adds (2013b): “La posibilidad de que esa reforma, hasta ahora bien delimitada a una flexibilización económica, amplíe derechos civiles con la nueva ley migratoria, y eventuales modificaciones en el sistema político, ha disparado las alarmas en sectores inmovilistas.” Castañeda (2012) writes in an ASCE paper: “las actuales reformas, ligeras, cosméticas, limitadas, pocas y lentas, y ahora paralizadas, son patéticamente inadecuadas.” Finally, we have to recognize that about 25% of the current Cuban labor force is in the private sector, and that this percentage was practically zero twenty years ago.

- ¹³⁶ Caetano succeeded ailing Salazar, in Portugal, in the 1960s. Unable or unwilling to make badly needed changes, he was deposed by the military during the *Revolución de los Claveles*, in 1973. Arias headed the Spanish government in 1975, when Franco died. He allowed the start of the Transition, and transferred the power to more moderate Franco era ministers (Suárez, Fraga) who successfully completed such Transition.
- ¹³⁷ “La Iglesia es tratada por el gobierno de Raúl Castro como si su feligresía acumulara las bases no representadas por el Partido Comunista. Este último ha concedido al clero católico derechos de asociación y expresión que, por ser negados a la ciudadanía, se convierten en privilegios” Rojas (2012).
- ¹³⁸ Such as the Grand Lodge of Cuba (Freemasons), Odd Fellows & Caballeros de la Luz (fraternal).
- ¹³⁹ Masons provided scores of civic and political leaders throughout Cuban history. Romeu (2013, 2014).
- ¹⁴⁰ “La llegada de Raúl al poder se dio acompañada de un impulso al debate público. Una nueva generación crítica ha surgido en la isla, no necesariamente desligada de las instituciones del Estado” Rojas (2013b).
- ¹⁴¹ “Un importante núcleo de intelectuales cubanos desde la diáspora vienen incidiendo en los debates sobre la compleja realidad cubana mediante la revisión historiográfica de nuestro pasado. Repartidos entre Ciudad México, Miami, New Jersey y Madrid.” González (2007). Such favorable review of a Cuban writer abroad, was published in Cuba's Catholic internet magazine *Espacio Laical* <<http://www.espaciolaical.org>>.

- ¹⁴² Díaz <<http://www.britannica.com/biography/Jesus-Diaz>> founder of web-based *Encuentro de la Cultura Cubana* <<http://www.cuba-encuentro.com/revista/revista-encuentro/>> literary magazine that publishes, side by side, work of Cuban writers living inside and outside the island, is strongly criticized by Cuban officials.
- ¹⁴³ Rafael Rojas o la Otra Cuba. Espacio Laical. <<http://www.espaciolaical.org/contens/11/5658.pdf>>. Rojas was born in 1965 (his father was Chancellor of the University of Havana in the 1980s). Rojas obtained a Doctorate in History from *Colegio de Mexico* and has written about Cuba and its history, and newspapers: *El País*: <http://elpais.com/autor/rafael_rojas/a/>; *Letras Libres*: <<http://www.letraslibres.com/autores/rafael-rojas>>. Rojas is criticized by Cuba's official media; <http://www.ecured.cu/index.php/Rafael_Rojas>.
- ¹⁴⁴ One example of such new thinking is: "Para construir un Nuevo modelo cívico que favorezca la democracia, es preciso nacionalizar el pasado colonial y republicano, reconocer derechos, abrir la nación al exilio, repatriar la diáspora, entretejer la Historia y Geografía, tolerar disidencias...". Rojas (2006)
- ¹⁴⁵ Trujillo, in Dominican Republic, Carias Andino, in Honduras and Ubico, in Guatemala, to name three.
- ¹⁴⁶ Such as the compliance with specific time-tables and schedules for holding elections, etc.

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